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Abstract
More than 50 years ago Bongard introduced 100 visual concept learning
problems as a testbed for intelligent vision systems. These problems are now
known as Bongard problems. Although they are well known in the cognitive sci-
ence and AI communities only moderate progress has been made towards build-
ing systems that can solve a substantial subset of them. In the system presented
here, visual features are extracted through image processing and then translated
into a symbolic visual vocabulary. We introduce a formal language that allows
representing complex visual concepts based on this vocabulary. Using this lan-
guage and Bayesian inference, complex visual concepts can be induced from the
examples that are provided in each Bongard problem. Contrary to other con-
cept learning problems the examples from which concepts are induced are not
random in Bongard problems, instead they are carefully chosen to communicate
the concept, hence requiring pragmatic reasoning. Taking pragmatic reasoning
into account we find good agreement between the concepts with high posterior
probability and the solutions formulated by Bongard himself. While this ap-
proach is far from solving all Bongard problems, it solves the biggest fraction
yet.
Keywords: Bongard problems, visual cognition, artificial intelligence, rational
analysis
1. Introduction
In the last few years computer vision has made tremendous progress on
object recognition and answering the question “what is where” in an image [34].
With recent advances in deep learning and big data, robust solutions finally
seem within grasp [26, 31]. Some even claim that human performance on object
recognition tasks has already been surpassed by machines [22].
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However, while knowing what is where is a good start, artificial intelligence
still has a long way to go before it can compete with human visual cognition
[23]. Humans still outperform computers in their ability to reason about the
visual world. They can separate relevant from irrelevant visual information,
relate visual observations to background knowledge, infer invisible properties,
generalize from very little data, interpret novel visual stimuli, predict what will
happen next in a scene, and act accordingly. In order to mimic these human
abilities, artificial vision systems will need to interact with higher reasoning
systems.
In cognitive science there is a long-standing debate about the interaction of
vision and cognition [41]. There are some aspects of “visual cognition” that
are clearly purely visual: they can be conceptualized as image processing only.
Filters in early vision are a prime example [4]. At the other end of the spec-
trum, solving Raven’s progressive matrices [5, 50, 28], a popular IQ test item,
trivially requires the visual system because the input is a visual stimulus. Other
than that, however, the task engages general problem solving mechanisms that,
presumably, are independent of vision. These two examples suggest that the
visual system operates on sub-symbolic mechanisms, like filters and neural net-
works, whereas reasoning about visual scenes is better described by a separate
symbolic system [but see 48].
However, there are also examples where it is much harder to tell which side
of the visual/cognitive boundary they are on. Take amodal completion. A
square that is covered by a circle is still perceived as a square, even though
the visual image does not actually contain a square. Does amodal completion
invoke symbolic, non-visual knowledge of squares? Or take the simple concept
of a triangle. There is obviously a strong visual component. But there is also
a symbolic component—a logical definition—that depends on more basic visual
concepts like edges, lines, angles, and corners: A tri-angle has three angles.
Such phenomena seem to suggest that there is a tight interaction between the
visual and the conceptual system. Over the years, some cognitive scientists
have insisted that many visual phenomena also show these more cognitive, often
language- or logic-like aspects [e.g. 2, 42, 44]. But if the early visual system is
sub-symbolic and the conceptual system is symbolic, how exactly do these two
systems interact in visual cognition and what is their interface?
Perhaps this question is a red herring. There is, of course, the possibility
that vision and cognition are just two ends of a continuum without a clearcut
boundary between them. Perhaps the same neural mechanisms are applied hier-
archically to achieve ever greater levels of abstraction and there is no meaningful
distinction between vision and cognition [e.g. 27]. Cognition is just deeper in the
brain. Instead of two separate modules—one for vision and one for cognition,
each operating on different principles—there might just be one deep, probably
recurrent, neural network.
Although the recent successes of deep learning in computer vision are impres-
sive, skepticism as to whether deep learning will be able capture higher aspects
of human visual cognition is warranted: For example, the way that neural net-
works generalize in computer vision problems [54, 37, 47] can be very different
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from intuitive human generalizations, although both systems, artificial neural
networks and humans, show a similarly high performance on benchmarks [51].
Even when only performance is considered as a criterion, differences between
deep networks and humans can go both ways, in that humans but not deep nets
systematically miss very large objects in visual scenes [8], while humans are
much more robust at object detection with respect to a variety of different noise
manipulations [18]. Also, a recent series of studies has focused on demonstrating
that human performance in classifying shapes, which are generated according to
a set of rules, are indeed better captured by symbolic shape inference systems
instead of systems utilizing features derived from deep convolutional networks
[11, 10, 39, 9].
Hence, it seems that is important to further improve deep neural networks
but, at the same time, to also explore possible ways for sub-symbolic visual
systems to interact with more classic symbolic techniques from artificial intel-
ligence. Historically, syntactic pattern recognition [17, 19] was an attempt to
bring symbolic techniques from language and logic, i.e. higher cognition, to bear
on the problems of vision. Early attempts were very successful on toy problems
[e.g. 53] but were unsatisfactory since it was unclear whether the same tech-
niques could ever be applied to real-world images. Given the progress that was
made on image processing and probabilistic modeling since the seventies, mod-
ern syntactic approaches to visual object recognition cannot be said to suffer
from these restrictions anymore. Stochastic grammars and graphical models can
capture the combinatorial variations and the internal structure of objects, and
probability theory allows us to combine these high-level representations with
noisy low-level image features in a principled manner [see e.g. 32, 55, 29].
With object recognition turning into a mature technology, we think the fo-
cus of research in computer vision will increasingly shift to scene understanding
with new benchmark datasets, e.g. for visual reasoning [25], and new criteria
for success. We expect vision systems to understand images and concepts that
they were not specifically trained for [30] and we would like these AI systems to
answer natural language questions about visual scenes, e.g. about the number
of drawers of the leftmost filing cabinet in a picture [33]. Combining computer
vision systems, natural language processing, semantic knowledge-bases, and rea-
soning systems for such a visual Turing test starts to become feasible. As the
necessary tools have been developed mostly independently so far, their integra-
tion and the specification of interfaces will become a more prominent topic. In
particular, we will need to specify representations that are sufficiently expres-
sive to capture the great variations in visual scenes but also allow for efficient
reasoning. In short, the central question in this line of research will be: What
is the language of vision?
2. Bongard problems
One of the first researchers to ask this question was Mikhail Moiseevich
Bongard [3]. He introduced the now so-called Bongard problems (BPs), that
were later popularized by Hofstadter [24, ch. 19], in order to demonstrate the
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inadequacy of the standard pattern recognition tools of the day for human-level
visual cognition [see also 35, 13]. A simple Bongard problem is shown in Fig. 1b.
Each Bongard problem consists of a set of twelve example images. The images
are geometric, binary images. They are divided into two classes. The first class
is given by the six images on the left while the second class is given by the
six examples on the right. The task for a vision system is to find two related
concepts that can discriminate between the left and the right side. For Fig. 1b
the solution that Bongard gives is: “Outline figures | Solid figures” [3, p. 247].
For each Bongard problem the solution is a logical rule given in natural language
that refers to visual features seen in the examples.
Bongard problems come in a huge variety and with varying difficulty. Some
of the problems are like IQ test items [cf. 23] and are relatively hard to solve but
many are rather easy for the human visual-cognitive system. More examples can
be seen in Fig. 1a to Fig. 1h.1 The challenge is to create a vision system that
can solve all Bongard problems without using ad-hoc solutions for each problem.
Bongard carefully hand-crafted these problems to illustrate the challenges that
an intelligent vision system needs to overcome. His problems can therefore
be used as a guidance to explore representations for vision systems [36]. For
example, Bongard problem #71 (Fig. 1h) illustrates the recursive use of the
inside relation to define a concept. This use of recursion, like many of the other
Bongard problems, again calls for language-like visual representations [3, 44, 45].
Although Bongard problems are well known among AI researchers and cog-
nitive scientists and are standardly used as demonstrations in inductive logic
programming [e.g. 7], few systems have been built that systematically try and
solve a significant subset of them (in contrast to, e.g., Raven’s progressive ma-
trices [5, 50, 28]). RF4 [43] is an inductive logic programming system that can
solve 41 of the 100 Bongard problems, but only because the researchers hand-
coded the images into logical formulas. Thus, the computer vision side of the
problem is completely avoided in this approach. Phaeaco, in contrast, [15] uses
images as inputs, but its expressivity is rather limited [15, ch. 11.2]. Of the
original 100 Bongard problems it can only reliably solve around 10.
Here we present a new method for solving Bongard problems that starts
with a set of image processing functions that extract basic shapes and visual
properties. Using this visual vocabulary we define a formal language, a context-
free grammar, that allows the expression of complex visual concepts. Using
Bayesian inference on the space of concepts we search for sentences in this
language that best describe a given Bongard problem. While this basic idea
corresponds to the intuitions already formulated by Bongard [3, ch. 9], progress
towards implementing a working system has been very slow so far.
1The original Bongard problems and additional, similar problems can be found on Harry
Foundalis’ webpage: http://www.foundalis.com/res/bps/bpidx.htm.
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(a) BP #2. Large figures | Small figures. (b) BP #3. Outline figures | Solid figures.
(c) BP #8. Figures on the right side | Fig-
ures on the left side.
(d) BP #21. Small figure present | No
small figure present.
(e) BP #25. Black figure is a triangle |
Black figure is a circle.
(f) BP #27. More solid black figures |
More outline figures.
(g) BP #49. Points inside are grouped
more densely than outside | Points outside
are grouped more densely than inside.
(h) BP #71. There are inside figures of the
second order | There are no inside figures
of the second order.
Figure 1: A Bongard problem (BP) consists of two sets of six binary images. The six images
on the left illustrate a visual concept and the six images on the right a related visual concept.
The task of the vision system is to describe the concept based on the examples.
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2.1. Preliminary Observations
Before we start explaining our system, a few preliminary observations are in
order. First, automated solvers for Bongard problems should not fail because
of problems in image processing. Bongard problems are just black and white
line drawings and they are a lot easier to process than natural images. If the
image is of sufficient quality and resolution, standard computer vision tools for
segmentation and feature extraction will work extremely well. While humans
can certainly deal with low quality images, image processing problems are not
our central concern here. Hence, we have created a clean subset of Bongard
problems with high resolution that makes the image processing side easy [in
contrast to 15].2
Second, Bongard problems are not easily solved by standard classification
methods. In fact, they were designed to illustrate how standard methods fell
short at the time. And they still do. The standard approach would be to extract
features from the images and then apply a classifier to the 12 examples. To make
this discussion more concrete we have extracted a number of standard computer
vision features from the example images (like the position, area, or perimeter
of the figures) and applied a standard decision tree algorithm (with the Gini
index as criterion) to separate the two classes. In some cases this seemed to
work well, e.g. for BP #2 (Fig. 1a) that merely distinguishes between small
and large objects. Fig. 2a shows that the decision tree algorithm distinguishes
the objects on the left and on the right based on their perimeter. However,
for more complicated Bongard problems the classifier usually overfits the small
number of samples. This is illustrated for BP #71 (see Fig. 1h) in Fig. 2b.
The learning algorithm capitalizes on incidental small differences in perimeter
between the few examples in the two classes. In this way the algorithm can
easily separate the two classes but does not learn the intended concept (“inside
figures of the second order”).
A common method to avoid overfitting is cross-validation. However, Bon-
gard problems are not like your off-the-shelf classification problem. There is
only a very small number of examples and, what is worse, these examples are
not random samples. For the most part Bongard carefully constructed the ex-
amples in order to convey the concept he had in mind. For example, in BP #71
(Fig. 1h) the shapes and number of objects are purposely varied to rule out
more specific hypotheses. Sometimes leaving out just one of the examples can
even make the intended concept ambiguous. For example, in BP #21 (Fig. 1d),
leaving out the example where all figures are small might suggest that there also
have to exist large figures or that the variability in size between the figures is
important. Bongard problems are therefore best understood as communication
problems: Bongard is trying to communicate a concept through carefully chosen
examples. Hence, solving a Bongard problem is not a problem of generalizing
well from random samples but a problem of inferring the intended concept in a
communicative situation [as in 46].
2These images are made available together with the publication as supplementary material.
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perimeter <= 112.8406
gini = 0.5
samples = 12
gini = 0.0000
samples = 6
value = [ 6.  0.]
gini = 0.0000
samples = 6
value = [ 0.  6.]
(a) Bongard problem #02. Large figures |
Small figures (see Fig. 1a).
perimeter <= 303.1279
gini = 0.5
samples = 12
gini = 0.0000
samples = 4
value = [ 0.  4.]
Entropy horizontal <= 4.1439
gini = 0.375
samples = 8
gini = 0.0000
samples = 5
value = [ 5.  0.]
perimeter <= 316.7203
gini = 0.444444444444
samples = 3
gini = 0.0000
samples = 2
value = [ 0.  2.]
gini = 0.0000
samples = 1
value = [ 1.  0.]
(b) Bongard problem #71. There are inside
figures of the second order | There are no in-
side figures of the second order (see Fig. 1h).
Figure 2: Applying decision trees to the Bongard problems. Two examples of using decision
trees to separate the two visual concepts. Left: The two concepts are distinguished based
on the perimeter. Right: Successive applications of decisions based on incidental feature
differences allow separating the left and right side images but does not correspond to the
intended visual concept.
In order to infer the intended concept, as a first step, we need to understand
the space of hypotheses that Bongard (or any other human) entertained. Which
visual concepts are “natural” enough to be considered? Even though Bongard
problems come in a huge variety, there are some recurring themes. For example,
some basic shapes, like circles, triangles, and squares occur in many problems.
Some shape properties, like size, position, orientation, and color (i.e. outline or
black) also frequently play a role. Very often, the relations between objects are
crucial, as in BP #71 (Fig. 1h) that hinges on the inside relation. Our aim was
not to build a general vision system, instead we decided to focus on these visual
shapes, properties and relations that appear in many of the Bongard problems
and hence seem to be likely candidates for a natural vocabulary from which
relevant visual concepts can be built.
For example, in BP #25 (Fig. 1e) figures have to have a certain shape and
a certain color: black triangles vs. black circles. Hence, a language to express
visual concepts will at the very least need logical operators to combine basic
visual properties and shapes. We will also need some form of quantification
as can clearly be seen in BP #1 (Fig. 1d): “Small figure present” vs. “No
small figure present”. Apart from such standard ingredients of logic, there are
other recurring patterns that we will need to express. For BP #27 (Fig. 1f), for
instance, we need to be able to count and state that there are more solid than
outlined figures in each image.
Last but not least, all solutions have the form of stating one concept for
the images on the left and one concept for the images on the right. The left-
concept has to apply to all images on the left and must not be true of any of the
images on the right, and conversely for the right-concept. Unfortunately, it is
not always clear how exactly the left-concept and the right-concept are related.
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Sometimes they are negations of each other (e.g. BP #21, Fig. 1d), but most
often they are not (e.g. BP #25, Fig. 1e). As, by definition, the negation of the
concept for one side is a valid concept for the other side we did not allow for
negation, assuming that people will strongly prefer the non-negated concepts.
This is consistent with concept attainment studies where subjects usually prefer
the positive examples of boolean concepts [12]. In this way, focusing attention
on one side or the other can lead to genuinely different concepts.
3. A visual language for solving Bongard problems
In the following we will describe the formal language in which solutions to
Bongard problems will be expressed. To anticipate what sentences in this formal
language will look like, consider the following solution to BP #27 (Fig. 1f)
right : >(outline(figures), solid(figures))
and its intended semantics. The expression after the colon applies to the ex-
ample images on the right, as indicated by the symbol right, i.e. the logical
expression is true for all example images on the right and false for all example
images on the left. The symbol > indicates a comparison in number of objects
of two sets in an example image. It is true iff the set in the first argument has
more elements than the set in the second argument. figures is the set of all
figures (or objects) in an example image. solid and outline act like filters that
select all solid and outline figures. Hence, the meaning of the full sentence is:
On the right, there are more outline figures than solid figures. Fig. 3 illustrates
how this expression is evaluated on two example images. To explain the formal
language and its semantics in more detail, we will proceed from the bottom up,
starting with the basic visual vocabulary and ending with the solutions that are
given in full sentences.
3.1. Extracting visual properties from Bonagard’s images
The visual language we will describe is based on objects that are extracted
using standard connected-component labeling. Bongard calls each visual object
a figure. A sentence in the language specifies a logical function that checks
whether certain visual properties of the figures are true for the images at hand.
The most common figure types in Bongard problems are circles, rectangles, and
triangles. We therefore implemented functions that can recognize each of these
categories in binary images. In addition to these categorical features we also
have functions that extract quantitative features from the objects, namely posi-
tion, size (logarithm of the area in pixels), orientation (angle of the largest eigen-
vector), convexity (ratio of area to area of convex hull), compactness (isoperi-
metric quotient), and elongation [49]. From these features, specific boolean
properties of the figures can be computed, e.g. whether a figure is solid or
outlined, or whether a figure is small or large compared to the other figures.
Solving Bongard problems also requires relational features and we implemented
functions that compute the distance between two figures, the angle of one figure
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Figure 3: Whether a sentence is true of an example image is checked by first identifying all
objects in an example image through connected component labeling and numbering them.
In the two example images shown, the the evaluation of the expression starts with with all
figures. Then the solid and the outlined figures are filtered out. Finally, it is checked wether
there are more outline figures than solid figures in each example figure.
relative to another, and whether a figure is inside another one. A last set of
functions can transform the binary pixel images of the figures into new images:
one returns the filled convex hull of the input image and another one inverts it,
thereby exposing the holes in it. For all these low-level visual computations we
used standard implementations whenever possible.3
3.2. Context free grammar for representing visual concepts
With these basic visual features in mind we define a context-free grammar
G that allows us to express complex visual concepts.
Definition 1. The visual grammar consists of a 4-tuple G = (NT , T ,R, R).
The grammar has six types of non-terminals, NT = {R,S, L,A, T,N}. The
production rules R of the grammar are given in Table 1. The terminals T
are the parentheses, the colon and all strings in small caps in Table 1. The
generation of every sentence of G starts with the startsymbol R.
A rule R is a description that applies either to the six images on the left
(left) or the six images on the right (right) side of a Bongard problem. A
sentence S is a logical function that can be evaluated on an image to check
whether it is true for this image. For example, consider BP #3 again (Fig. 1b).
A rule that describes this problem is left : ∃(outline(figures)): there are
outline figures on the left. Part of the semantics of this rule is also that the
negation applies to the six images on the right, namely that there are no outline
figures. As outlined and solid figures are mutually exclusive, the same problem
could also equivalently be described by the rule right : ∃(solid(figures)).
3http://scikit-image.org
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R→ left : S R→ right : S
S → ∃(L) S → =(L,L) S → >(L,A) S → (L,A)
S → #(N,L) S → >(L,L) S → >(L,L,A) S → (L,L,A)
L→ ∩(L,L) L→ inside(L) L→ solid(L) L→ figures
L→ ∪(L,L) L→ contains(L) L→ outline(L) L→ circles
L→ \(L,L) L→ aligned(L) L→ large(L) L→ triangles
L→ get(L, T ) L→ small(L) L→ rectangles
L→ high(L,A)
L→ low(L,A)
A→ xpos A→ orientation A→ size A→ elongation
A→ ypos A→ ncorners A→ compactness T → hulls
A→ distance A→ color A→ convexity T → holes
N → 1 N → 2 N → 3 N → 4
Table 1: The context-free grammar G that is used to describe solutions to Bongard problems
We consider each of the two rules to be a solution to BP #3 and thereby
together capture the solution that was given by Bongard: “Outline figures |
Solid figures.” Remember that sometimes, for example for BP #71 (Fig. 1h),
one side is explicitly the negation of the other side, but most often this is not
the case (see Preliminary Observations above). In these other cases, like BP
#3, one side is the negation of the other side only under certain presuppositions
that are implicit to the problem. For BP #3 such an implicit presupposition is
that there is only one figure in each image and that each figure is either outlined
or solid.
For the full semantics behind the grammar consider the L-symbols next. The
terminals figures, circles, triangles, and rectangles stand for functions
that for a given image return a set with all the figures of the respective kind. The
first three L-rules are standard set-theoretic operations: intersection, union, and
set-difference. Using just these and the terminals an example for an L-subclause
of a sentence is ∪(circles,triangles) which returns a set with all the circles
and all the triangles in an image. If there are none the set will be empty.
The symbols inside and contains refer to binary relations that are im-
plemented as monadic predicates, akin to some description logics [1]. Hence,
inside(L) returns the set containing each object that lies inside of any object
in L. Suppose there is a triangle inside of a rectangle and nothing else. Then
inside(rectangles) will return a set containing only this triangle. Similarly,
contains(rectangles) will return the triangle. The symbol aligned stands
for a function that returns the biggest subset of L with the property that all the
objects lie on a straight line. It does so by enumerating the power-set of L and
computing pairwise angles between the centroids. If these angles do not differ
more than a defined threshold a subset is declared as being on a straight line.
For the meaning of get(L, T ) we turn to the non-terminal T . The function
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get(L, T ) evaluates the non-terminal L first and passes the resulting set of ob-
jects to the transformation process determined by T . Then the transformation
is applied to all objects in the set to either get their filled convex hull (hulls) or
the holes (holes) of the image of an object. get(L, T ) thus returns a set of new
objects that were not originally in the image. These transformations are needed
for some Bongard problems where the objects that the rules relate to cannot be
found through connected component labeling, but have to be constructed (e.g.
BP #12, #34, #35, not shown).
The functions for the symbols solid, outline, large, and small filter
out the objects with the respective property from a set of objects. For the
semantics of high(L,A) and low(L,A) we first turn to the non-terminals A.
The A-rules represent numerical attributes that can be extracted from objects,
such as size, position, or color (degree of blackness). Orientation is the only
circular variable and hence we need to be careful for comparisons to make sense
(e.g. we cannot compute means or variances on angles). The only attribute that
does not have an obvious semantics is distance. When distance is applied
to a set of objects it computes for each object the minimum distance to all
the other objects in the set. As an example for the semantics of high consider
high(figures,xpos) that appears in the solution to BP #8 (Fig. 1c). It
returns all the figures in a given image that have a high x-position relative to all
figures in all images of the Bongard problem under consideration. In order for
high and low to be meaningful there should be a noticeable difference between
the figures with a high and those with a low x-position and we search for the
best split that maximizes the difference between the high− and the low-class,
ensuring that the difference is large enough to be perceptually relevant. Note
that, small(triangles) is simply a shorthand for low(triangles, size) and
this is also how it is implemented (see Discussion section).
The non-terminal S connects all these operations on sets of objects into a
logical statement about the images. Each function that can be built by the
S-rules returns a truth value (as opposed to the L-functions that return sets of
objects). ∃(L) means the set L is not empty and #(N,L) evaluates to true if
there are exactly N objects (where we assume that people can only subitize up
to four). To be able to check, for example, whether there are as many or more
triangles as circles we have the relations =(L,L) and >(L,L).
We can also compare two sets of objects with respect to any of the visual at-
tributes A using >(L,L,A), e.g. >(triangles,circles,xpos) checks whether
all triangles are right of (have a greater x-position than) all circles. The two ar-
gument version >(L,A) compares the attribute on all the relevant figures for the
left and the right side of the Bongard problem, e.g. left : >(figures,xpos)
means that the figures in the left-class have a greater x-position than the
figures in the right-class (also solving Bongard problem #8).
To compare the similarity of objects with respect to an attribute we use
(L,L,A). Imagine an image where the triangles have the same size but the
circles vary in size, then (triangles,circles, size) will compute the size of
the circles and the triangles and return true if the variance in size is smaller
for the triangles than for the circles. It is a little tricky to decide whether the
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differences in variance are perceptually meaningful. We do this by checking
that that the difference in log variance between the classes is bigger than the
differences in log variance within the classes. Finally, (L,A) checks whether
the L-objects in the class specified by the top rule R are more similar to each
other with respect to A than the L-objects in the other class. For example, if in
the left class every image contains two objects and they are of the same size and
in the right class there are two objects in each image but with different sizes,
then left : (objects, size) will be true.
One complication for the S-rules is that for some of them the truth value
is undefined if they involve empty sets, e.g. >(triangles,circles,xpos)
is neither true nor false if there are no triangles in the image. The condi-
tion that checks for equal numbers is also problematic if called on two empty
sets. While mathematically true it expands the hypothesis space dramati-
cally with hypotheses that humans will almost certainly not entertain. For
example, say, that the concept on the left is “there does not exist a trian-
gle” (and some images also contain circles). Then we can form sentences like
=(triangles,∩(circles,triangles)), that are highly unlikely to be consid-
ered by humans. Hence, all such cases involving the “unintuitive” empty set are
taken as undefined and will be excluded as valid hypotheses (see Eq. 4.2 below).
4. Probabilistic model and inference
Given the above language for visual concepts, there are many ways to define
a score for how well a concept can solve a Bongard problem and many search
algorithms that could be used to find the best solution. Here, we frame the
problem as one of Bayesian inference and use standard sampling methods. This
approach has previously been very successful for other human concept learning
tasks [20, 39]. As there will usually be several potential solutions, the system,
and humans as well, should entertain several of them and state their relative
plausibility. Using sampling the full posterior distribution over potential ex-
pressions is approximated instead of just finding the one best solution through
search.
4.1. Problem formulation
We assume, that a visual concept can be expressed by a rule using the above
context free grammar. For each Bongard problem two disjoint sets of six images
Eleft = {E1, ..., E6} and Eright = {E7, ..., E12} are given. The six examples in
Eleft belong to the class on the left while the other six in Eright belong to
class on the right, and E = (Eleft, Eright) is the tuple of both sets. We need
to specify a likelihood that expresses the probabilistic relationship between the
images E and a particular rule R and a prior probability distribution over rules
R within the grammar G. Then we can compute the posterior distribution over
rules R from the grammar G given the twelve examples E:
P (R|E,G) ∝ P (E|R)P (R|G).
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4.2. Model
We take the same prior as the Rational-Rules model that has previously
been applied successfully to human concept learning tasks [20]. Every rule in
our Grammar G can be expressed as a sentence starting with one of the six
types of non-terminals {R,S, L,A, T,N} defined above. More complex rules
are obtained by successively applying the production rules of our Grammar
G. This allows defining a prior over rules by assigning a probability to each
production resulting in the product of probabilities of all individual production
rules involved in generating a particular rule. By including uncertainty over the
production probabilities one can derive a prior over rules obtained through our
context-free grammar by integrating out the production probabilities using a
flat Dirichlet prior. This integration leads to the following expression for the
rule prior [see 20, for details]:
P (R|G) =
∏
Y ∈NT
β(CY (R) + 1)
β(1)
,
where NT is the set of non-terminals in the grammar G, β(c) is the multinomial
beta function, and CY (R) counts for non-terminal Y the uses of each production
in R. Hence, CY (R) has dimensionality equal to the number of productions for
Y and 1 is a vector of equal length.4
This prior has two key properties that are relevant in the context of solving
Bongard problems. First, this prior favors shorter rules compared to longer
rules because of the monotonicity property of the multinomial Beta function
in the number of counts of non-terminals in a rule. Accordingly, less complex
formulas are preferred. Second, this prior favors rules that contain identical
subtrees, thereby encouraging the reuse of productions in their generation. This
is because for the multinomial beta distribution the following relation holds:
β(i, j, ...) < β(i + 1, j − 1, ...) if i ≥ j.
Thus a formula containing a non-terminal Y twice is more probable than a
formula of equal length with two different productions of Y .
For the likelihood we choose:
P (E|R) ∝
{
1 if E is compatible with R
0 otherwise.
E is compatible with R iff all of the following conditions are met:
1. if R refers to the left side then all images in Eleft fulfill it and no image
in Eright,
2. if R refers to the right side then all images in Eright fulfill it and no
image in Eleft,
4Just like for normal PCFGs [6] it is interesting to ask under which conditions the distri-
bution is proper.
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3. no image in Eleft or Eright returns undefined when R is applied to it,
4. the images E are informative about the rule R.
The last condition requires some explanation. To be informative the following
pragmatic reasoning is applied.
4.2.1. Pragmatic reasoning
Bongard constructed each problem very carefully to illustrate the rule in
question. As we already emphasized in the introduction, we conceptualize
Bongard problems as having to infer the intended concept in a communica-
tive situation. As usual in communication, understanding Bongard’s message
requires pragmatic reasoning. Say, for example, Bongard wanted to find exam-
ples for the rule “there are circles or triangles” on the left side of the problem:
left : ∃(∪(circles,triangles)). Not all the images have to have circles in
them. However, if Bongard wants us to be able to solve the problem, he will
include some circles in the problem. If no circles appeared in any of the images
then we would not even consider circles when trying to solve the problem.
Hence, we assume in the likelihood that Bongard chose the examples to be
informative about the rule to account for this pragmatic effect. How the in-
formativeness condition is spelled out in detail can greatly improve both the
quality of the found solutions and the time efficiency of our inference mecha-
nism. Taking this pragmatic effect into account is one of the main innovations
of our approach. Concretely, we reject E if it does not contain at least once
each of the zero-arity L-terminals (objects, solid, triangles, ...) that are
mentioned in the rule R. A number of other symbols (inside, contains, high,
low, distance) require that at least two (or even three in the case of aligned)
objects are present to be informative. Similarly, if inside or contains are in
the rule, at least one image should have one object inside another object. the
informativeness condition in the likelihood licenses pruning the search space
dramatically: If E is not informative about R (e.g., there are no triangles even
though triangles is mentioned in R) then R has likelihood zero and we do not
need to explore it.
4.3. Inference algorithm
Sampling from the posterior distribution is done by a Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm with sub-tree regeneration as a proposal distribution [20], with the
additional pragmatic pruning described in the previous paragraph. To improve
the convergence of the chain the likelihood in the sampler is a soft version of
the above likelihood that allows for some mistakes in the rules (increasing the
“temperature”). If n is the number of mistakes that a rule makes on the 12
images then the likelihood was εn, but all samples with n > 0 were discarded
at the end. We run the model for each Bongard problem independently and for
each posterior distribution we set up 6 independent chains. For each chain we
collect 50,000 samples (after thinning by a factor of ten and a burn-in of at least
100.000). How many of the 300,000 samples fulfill the hard likelihood condition
(number of mistakes n = 0) depends on how difficult the problem is to solve.
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A few implementational details are worth mentioning. Sub-tree regeneration
is done with a PCFG and setting the probabilities with which each rule fires has
an influence on the performance of the algorithm. First, the probabilities need
to be set in a way that the PCFG does not produce infinite trees (i.e. it is proper
[6]). This can be achieved by not giving recursive rules too much probability
mass. Second, the informativeness constraint in the likelihood licences setting
the production probabilities for some rules to zero because they will be rejected
later anyway and hence need not be generated (note, however, that this pruning
interacts with the “temperature” parameter ε). In order to make the algorithm
run in acceptable time, it was necessary to make extensive use of caching to
avoid re-computations of likelihoods and priors whenever possible.
5. Inferring visual concepts for Bongard problems
We evaluated the system on a subset of Bongard problems. The selection of
problems was dependent on three criteria. First, a problem should not require
highly advanced computer vision techniques. We deliberately wanted to keep
the traditional computer vision side simple and focus on the cognitive, symbolic
representations. For this reason we have, for example, excluded all problems
that involve occlusion. While we expect that for occlusion the interaction be-
tween visual and cognitive modules is particularly important, we will leave this
for future work. Second, a Bongard problem should not require specific world
knowledge or sophisticated object recognition. BP #100, for example, shows
different letters on both sides with varying fonts and was therefore excluded.
And third, the problem has a solution that can be expressed in our visual lan-
guage. In many cases we could have extended the language to be able to deal
with specific Bongard problems but we tried to avoid the introduction of ad-hoc
constructs that will only appear in the solution of one problem. With these
restrictions we were left with a set of 39 Bongard problems.5 For the remain-
ing problems we already know that our system will not be able to solve them
because our visual language cannot express reasonable solutions. Note, how-
ever, that even if the language can express a solution to a BP, it is not obvious
whether the solution will be found.
Fig. 4 shows the solutions for four exemplary Bongard problems. Fig. 4a
depicts a problem that is solved very well, in the sense that it assigns a high
probability to reasonable rules. The highest probability rule was that there
is a triangle on the left side, ∃(triangles), as it should be. For the right
side the highest probability rule was that it has more corners than the left
side, >(figures,ncorners). This is not the solution that Bongard gives. His
solution refers to “quadrangles”. But even though the system does not have
a word for “quadrangle”, arguably, it still found a reasonable solution for the
right side. Often the posterior was less peaked than in Fig. 4a, but this is
5BP 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 56, 58, 65, 66, 71, 79
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left p
∃(triangles) .69
#(1, triangles) .17
∃(get(triangles, hulls)) .02
∃(∪(triangles, triangles)) .00
#(1, get(triangles, hulls)) .00
right p
>(figures, ncorners) .07
∃(high(figures, ncorners)) .00
>(∪(figures, figures), ncorners) .00
>(∩(figures, figures), ncorners) .00
>(∪(triangles, figures), ncorners) .00
Remaining rules .04
(a) BP #6. Triangles | Quadrangles.
left p
∃(contains(triangles)) .10
∃(inside(circles)) .10
#(1, inside(circles)) .03
#(1, contains(triangles)) .03
∃(outline(contains(triangles))) .01
right p
∃(contains(circles)) .12
∃(inside(triangles)) .12
#(1, inside(triangles)) .03
#(1, contains(circles)) .03
∃(contains(inside(triangles))) .01
Remaining rules .43
(b) BP #47. Triangle inside of circle | Circle inside of triangle.
left p
(figures, ypos) .24
(circles, ypos) .23
(small(figures), ypos) .01
(aligned(figures), ypos) .01
(outline(circles), ypos) .01
right p
(circles, xpos) .23
(circles, figures, xpos) .01
(outline(circles), xpos) .01
(aligned(circles), xpos) .01
(small(figures), xpos) .01
Remaining rules .21
(c) BP #66. Unconnected circles on a horizontal line | Unconnected circles on a vertical line.
left p
No rules were found
right p
>(circles,∪(solid(circles), triangles), distance) .12
>(circles,∪(triangles, solid(circles)), distance) .09
>(circles, \(figures, outline(circles)), distance) .06
>(circles,∪(solid(figures), triangles), distance) .06
>(circles,∪(triangles, solid(figures)), distance) .05
Remaining rules .61
(d) BP #79. A dark circle is closer to the triangle than to the outline circle | A dark circle is
closer to the outline circle than to the triangle.
Figure 4: Example solutions for Bongard problems found by a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The four tables give the five most probable rules for each side of the respective Bongard
problem (left and right). The last column shows the proportion of samples p for each rule.
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to be expected with many logically equivalent rules. The system can also find
relatively complex rules as shown by Fig. 4d, although the fact that only rules for
the right side were found shows that this rule was hard to find and the Markov
chain did not converge. For most of the problems it was similarly obvious to all
three authors that our system found reasonable solutions as the ones with the
highest posterior probability. For instance, for the problem shown in Fig. 4b
the “correct” solution is “triangle inside of circle | circle inside of triangle.” The
system finds that on the left there is a triangle inside another object and that
there is a circle that contains another object but not that one is in the other. As
we decided, for reasons of efficiency, to represent binary relations by monadic
predicates this is the best the language can do.
As these examples show, whether a rule expressed in a formal language is
a reasonable solution to a Bongard problem, very often requires a subjective
judgement. Is the expression close enough to Bongard’s solution that is given in
natural language? If not, it may still be a solution that many people would ac-
cept. While we think that the solutions that our system finds are all reasonable,
they are not always ideal. One systematic problem that we have encountered is,
again, of a pragmatic nature. In BP #41 (not shown) the left side shows “outline
circles on a straight line”. The system finds ∃(aligned(outline(figures)))
and ∃(aligned(outline(circles))) with the same probability. Bongard gives
the more specific solution, referring to circles instead of figures, but for the
system the two expressions have the same length and therefore the same prior
probability. For the system there is no reason to prefer one over the other. One
could try and include this pragmatic effect to prefer specificity in the likelihood.
However, in this particular problem all figures are circles and hence with this
presupposition there is no need to be more specific. We therefore think that
both solutions are reasonable.
Unclear presuppositions are an issue in many Bongard problems. Take
BP #6 (Fig. 4a), again; each image contains exactly one figure irrespective
of whether they are on the left or on the right. For the left side Bongard gives
the solution “triangles” instead of “there is only one figure and it is a triangle”,
presumably because there being exactly one figure does not help discriminate
between the left and the right side. Sometimes, however, the presuppositions are
reflected in Bongard’s rule. The solution for BP #25 (Fig. 1e) is “black figure
is a triangle — black figure is a circle.” Here, it is made explicit that there is
exactly one black figure on both sides. Our system finds ∃(solid(triangles)),
there is a solid triangle, as the most probable solution for the left side. If also
finds the slightly longer and therefore less probable #(1, solid(triangles)),
there is exactly one solid triangle. But it does not specify the full presuppo-
sition that there is only one solid figure irrespective what the side is. As our
current implementation treats the solution for the left side and the right side
independently, it cannot express these presuppositions, and we therefore also
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consider these problems reasonably solved.6
Overall, we consider 35 of the 39 problems to be solved, i.e. all three au-
thors agree that the solutions are reasonable. However, not all readers might
agree with our assessment and we have therefore included all results in the sup-
plementary material (just 4 of the 39 problems are shown in Fig. 4). For the
remaining 4 problems the system found the intended solution among the top five
solutions on both sides, but it also found another, shorter solution that received
a higher probability. In two cases one could argue that the solution is as valid
as the one given by Bongard. For BP #27 (Fig. 1f) the system finds: right :
>(outline(figures),circles), on the right side there are more outline figures
as circles. And for BP #49 (Fig. 1g) it finds: left : (figures,distance),
the similarity between the distances among the figures is more similar on the
right side than on the left side. In BP #66 (Fig. 4c) the system finds reliably
that the y-positions of the circles are more similar on the left than on the right,
(circles,ypos), but it also finds (figures,ypos) with equal probability.
Because of the connected-component labeling the system treats all the connected
circles as one object and as we compute the position as the mean of an object
the system also finds that actually all figures (not just the circles) have a more
similar y-position. As the system cannot see the circles in the connected circles,
it does give a reasonable solution—but for the wrong reasons. Finally, BP #48
finds a rule that exploits the brittleness of the visual preprocessing where we
have set thresholds to decide whether logical predicates apply and the rule that
is found is just above this threshold.
The above comparison between the rules provided by Bongard and the rules
found by our system point to a fundamental difficulty regarding the evaluation
of cognitive vision systems beyond object recognition. Unless one runs an exper-
iment with human participants who judge the reasonableness of a solution, it is
hard to quantitatively evaluate the performance of a system that solves Bongard
problems. Of course, the evaluation of object recognition systems also relies on
humans providing ground-truth labels, but to benchmark artificial systems you
only need to count how often their labels agree exactly with the human labels.
Here, the comparison is not as simple. Hence, while we think that Bongard
problems provide an interesting testbed for visual cognition, they do not easily
allow us to benchmark different systems. Having said that, our system clearly
performs much better than Phaeaco [15] that can only solve around 10 prob-
lems. RF4 [43] solves roughly the same number of problems as our system but
the inputs are hand-translated logical rules and not images. Presumably the
researchers did not write down the large number of correct, but irrelevant facts
6We have tried to learn one rule for the presuppositions that apply to both sides and two
separate rules that have to hold additionally for each side. So far, however, the results of this
approach have been disappointing. As the prior prefers shorter rules and more specific rules
are longer, the presuppositions tend to be too unspecific (“there exist figures” instead of “there
exists exactly one solid figure”). Using the size principle [52] to prefer more specific solutions
in the likelihood seems like a good idea to solve this problem, but it is not immediately clear
how it can be applied here.
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about each image that our system needs to deal with. Therefore, even though
we cannot easily measure progress, our system clearly does outperform previous
systems.
6. Discussion
Bongard problems were originally constructed to illustrate that human vi-
sual cognition is much more flexible and language-like than the first pattern
recognition algorithms. Interestingly, Bongard problems still pose a challenge
for modern day artificial intelligence and progress has been surprisingly slow.
We have constructed a visual language that allows us to solve a significant num-
ber of Bongard problems, while still using images as inputs. Like in other human
concept learning tasks, using Bayesian inference and the Rational-Rules prior
proved to be a fruitful starting point [20]. Additionally, we found it helpful
to conceptualize Bongard problems as concept communication problems [46].
This allowed us to prune large portions of the search space through pragmatic
reasoning.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is an interesting question to ask where
vision ends and cognition starts [41]. Here, we have concentrated on the cogni-
tive side, even though the inputs were actual images. In a language for vision
the interface between the visual and the cognitive system is given by the sym-
bols that can be grounded out directly in operations on the visual image. In
our language, some of the terminals seem far removed from the visual input,
however, and therefore one might worry that our language is not very domain
general. For example, we have included the predicates solid and outline as
primitives for the language because they not only help in problem #3 but oc-
cur in many other Bongard problems, too. For the basic vocabulary that we
have chosen one can argue that a mature human visual-cognitive system comes
equipped with these concepts and that for solving Bongard problems we want to
focus on how known visual concepts are combined to form new concepts, rather
than explaining how the basic terms were learned in the first place. It is, in
principle, easy to replace our simple visual system with a more advanced and
robust visual system that is capable of learning (such as a neural network) and
thereby explain, e.g., how the concept for solid is learned from more realistic
images. Nevertheless, learning might also happen at the symbolic level. Note
that our language has a predicate color that will return a high value if an
object is black and a low values if an object is white. We can therefore express
solid(triangles) equivalently as high(triangles,color), namely those tri-
angles that have a high value on the color attribute. Similarly we can paraphrase
large(triangles) as high(triangles, size). The shorter expressions are pre-
ferred in the prior and therefore adding these redundant abbreviations make a
difference for the performance of the system. It is straightforward to imagine
why and how these redundant shorter representations might have been learned.
If high(triangles, size) is used very frequently then we would like to make one
chunk out of it. So far we have treated each Bongard problem separately but
using a sequence of Bongard problems and re-using previously learned concepts
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for new problems seems very desirable for explaining how some of the basic
concepts are learned. In future work, this could be achieved by using fragment
grammars as a prior [38].
Our primary goal in this paper was to develop a useful language for repre-
senting simple, geometric, visual scenes. While our language is useful for Bon-
gard problems, it is certainly not a domain-general language for vision. What
is the right language of vision? Taking triangles and circles as basic concepts is
different than taking lines and corners as basic concepts. Whether one judges
a system that solves Bongard problems to be successful crucially depends on
knowing how the system works internally and whether one considers the repre-
sentations and mechanisms that lead to the solution as cognitively interesting.
The more problems can be solved intelligently with general mechanisms and
without using cheap tricks, the better. The art is to choose the right vocabu-
lary and the right formal language in which to express visual concepts. We hope
that some of the constructions we proposed here might turn out to be useful for
other visual and cognitive tasks. In fact, we see this project as part of a larger
enterprise in cognitive science and AI to discover appropriate representations
for a domain-general probabilistic language of thought [21, 40].
But even the right language of vision will not be enough to explain how
humans solve Bongard problems. As Bongard problems can be considered com-
munication problems—Bongard tries to communicate a concept through the
examples—we do not only have to deal with the syntax and the semantics of
visual concepts but also with the pragmatics of the situation. Improving the vi-
sion module and the formal language are certainly necessary if we want to solve
more Bongard problems in the future, or if we want to deal with other visual-
cognitive tasks. When we started working on Bongard problems, we thought
these are the most important aspects for progress on visual cognition. However,
it turned out that without also considering the pragmatic reasoning that allows
us to prune away large portions of the search space, we could not get our system
to work. Many of the remaining issues that we encounter with the solutions that
our system produces are of a pragmatic nature. For example, if Bongard chose
very specific examples, he probably did not want us to consider more general
hypotheses, even if they are much shorter. Similarly, for many problems there
are implicit presuppositions that apply to all images in the problem. Without
these presuppositions the solutions for each side simply do not make sense.
The pragmatic situation in Bongard problems is very particular and there-
fore these pragmatic issues might seem irrelevant for other visual-cognitive tasks.
However, we suspect that any visual-cognitive task on which two humans in-
teract through language will involve a certain amount of pragmatic reasoning.
For example, if there is only one circle in a scene, it is unnecessary to be more
specific and refer to it as the outline circle [16]. Hence, any AI system that
will interact with humans on a visual-cognitive task, will also have to have
some pragmatic reasoning abilities (which is currently missing even from some
of the most advanced systems [e.g. 33, 14]). Bongard problems are a testbed to
study this kind of interaction of image processing, conceptual representations,
and inductive and pragmatic reasoning. Further progress on integrating these
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visual and cognitive processes into a working system for solving Bongard prob-
lems is likely to inspire general architectures for visual cognition that go beyond
answering “what is where”.
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BP #1
Samples: 299484
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 518
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left empty figure p
right not empty figure p
∃(figures) .84
∃(outline(figures)) .05
∃(get(figures, hulls)) .02
∃(get(figures, holes)) .02
∃(∩(figures, figures)) .01
Remaining rules .07
25
BP #2
Samples: 296981
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 3020
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left large figures p
>(figures, size) .44
∃(large(figures)) .25
#(1, large(figures)) .06
∃(large(large(figures))) .03
∃(high(figures, size)) .02
right small figures p
∃(small(figures)) .03
#(1, small(figures)) .01
∃(small(get(figures, hulls))) .01
∃(low(figures, size)) .00
∃(small(small(figures))) .00
Remaining rules .14
26
BP #3
Samples: 299873
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 129
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left outline figures p
∃(outline(figures)) .16
∃(get(figures, holes)) .07
#(1, outline(figures)) .04
#(1, get(figures, holes)) .02
∃(outline(outline(figures))) .02
right solid figures p
>(figures, color) .29
∃(solid(figures)) .18
#(1, solid(figures)) .04
∃(solid(solid(figures))) .02
∃(high(figures, color)) .01
Remaining rules .15
27
BP #4
Samples: 299707
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 293
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left convex figures p
>(figures, convexity) .96
>(∩(figures, figures), convexity) .01
>(∪(figures, figures), convexity) .01
>(∪(figures, triangles), convexity) .00
>(∪(circles, figures), convexity) .00
right nonconvex figures p
>(get(figures, hulls), figures, convexity) .00
>(figures, get(figures, hulls), ncorners) .00
>(solid(get(figures, hulls)), figures, convexity) .00
>(get(get(figures, hulls), hulls), figures, convexity) .00
>(get(get(figures, hulls), holes), figures, convexity) .00
Remaining rules .02
28
BP #6
Samples: 299620
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 382
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left triangles p
∃(triangles) .69
#(1, triangles) .17
∃(get(triangles, hulls)) .02
∃(∪(triangles, triangles)) .00
#(1, get(triangles, hulls)) .00
right quadrangles p
>(figures, ncorners) .07
∃(high(figures, ncorners)) .00
>(∪(figures, figures), ncorners) .00
>(∩(figures, figures), ncorners) .00
>(∪(triangles, figures), ncorners) .00
Remaining rules .04
29
BP #7
Samples: 298734
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1267
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left figures elongated vertically p
>(figures, orientation) .86
∃(high(figures, orientation)) .04
>(get(figures, hulls), orientation) .02
#(1, high(figures, orientation)) .01
>(∩(figures, figures), orientation) .01
right figures elongated horizontally p
∃(low(figures, orientation)) .01
∃(low(get(figures, hulls), orientation)) .00
#(1, low(figures, orientation)) .00
∃(large(∪(low(figures, orientation), rectangles))) .00
∃(low(large(figures), orientation)) .00
Remaining rules .04
30
BP #8
Samples: 299785
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 215
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left figures on the right side p
>(figures, xpos) .76
>(outline(figures), xpos) .04
∃(high(figures, xpos)) .02
>(get(figures, holes), xpos) .02
>(get(figures, hulls), xpos) .02
right figures on the left side p
∃(low(figures, xpos)) .03
#(1, low(figures, xpos)) .01
#(1, outline(low(figures, xpos))) .00
∃(low(outline(figures), xpos)) .00
∃(get(low(figures, xpos), hulls)) .00
Remaining rules .09
31
BP #9
Samples: 288291
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 11709
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left smooth contour figures p
>(figures, compactness) .88
>(outline(figures), compactness) .05
>(get(figures, holes), compactness) .02
>(outline(outline(figures)), compactness) .01
>(∩(figures, figures), compactness) .01
right twisting contour figures p
Remaining rules .04
32
BP #11
Samples: 299971
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 30
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left elongated figures p
right compact figures p
>(figures, compactness) .87
>(outline(figures), compactness) .05
>(get(figures, holes), compactness) .02
∃(high(figures, compactness)) .01
>(outline(outline(figures)), compactness) .01
Remaining rules .05
33
BP #12
Samples: 159414
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 140588
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left convex figure shell elongated p
right convex figure shell compact p
>(get(figures, hulls), compactness) .77
>(get(get(figures, hulls), hulls), compactness) .05
>(get(outline(figures), hulls), compactness) .04
>(get(get(figures, hulls), holes), compactness) .03
>(get(get(get(figures, hulls), hulls), hulls), compactness) .01
Remaining rules .10
34
BP #21
Samples: 299339
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 662
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left small figure present p
∃(small(figures)) .47
∃(low(figures, size)) .05
>(figures, large(figures)) .04
∃(small(outline(figures))) .02
∃(outline(small(figures))) .02
right no small figure present p
=(figures, large(figures)) .05
=(large(figures), figures) .04
=(figures, high(figures, size)) .01
=(figures, large(large(figures))) .00
=(large(large(figures)), figures) .00
Remaining rules .28
35
BP #22
Samples: 299994
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 9
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left areas of figures approximately equal p
(figures, size) .82
(outline(figures), size) .05
(get(figures, hulls), size) .02
(get(figures, holes), size) .02
(∪(figures, figures), size) .00
right areas of figures differ greatly p
Remaining rules .08
36
BP #23
Samples: 299937
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 63
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left one figure p
#(1, figures) .40
#(1, outline(figures)) .02
#(1, get(figures, holes)) .01
#(1, get(figures, hulls)) .01
∃(low(figures, distance)) .01
right two figures p
#(2, figures) .40
#(2, outline(figures)) .02
#(2, get(figures, hulls)) .01
#(2, get(figures, holes)) .01
∃(high(figures, distance)) .01
Remaining rules .10
37
BP #24
Samples: 299921
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 81
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left a circle p
∃(circles) .83
∃(outline(circles)) .05
∃(get(circles, hulls)) .02
∃(get(circles, holes)) .02
∃(outline(outline(circles))) .01
right no circle p
=(figures,∪(figures, get(circles, holes))) .00
=(figures,∪(figures, get(circles, hulls))) .00
=(∪(rectangles, triangles), figures) .00
=(∪(triangles, rectangles), figures) .00
=(figures,∪(triangles, rectangles)) .00
Remaining rules .08
38
BP #25
Samples: 299778
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 225
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left black figure is a triangle p
∃(solid(triangles)) .20
#(1, solid(triangles)) .05
∃(solid(solid(triangles))) .02
∃(high(triangles, color)) .02
=(outline(circles), circles) .02
right black figure is a circle p
∃(solid(circles)) .19
#(1, solid(circles)) .06
>(circles, outline(circles)) .02
∃(solid(solid(circles))) .02
∃(high(circles, color)) .02
Remaining rules .38
39
BP #26
Samples: 298585
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1415
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left solid black triangle p
∃(solid(triangles)) .42
>(triangles, outline(triangles)) .05
∃(solid(solid(triangles))) .04
∃(high(triangles, color)) .03
>(triangles, get(triangles, holes)) .02
right no solid black triangle p
=(outline(triangles), triangles) .04
=(triangles, outline(triangles)) .04
=(get(triangles, holes), triangles) .02
=(triangles, get(triangles, holes)) .02
=(low(triangles, color), triangles) .01
Remaining rules .31
40
BP #27
Samples: 288897
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 11103
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left more solid black figures p
(∪(get(figures, hulls), figures), color) .02
(∪(get(figures, holes), figures), color) .02
>(solid(figures), outline(figures)) .02
(∪(figures, get(figures, holes)), color) .02
(∪(figures, get(figures, hulls)), color) .02
right more outline figures p
>(outline(figures), circles) .21
>(get(figures, holes), circles) .09
>(outline(figures), solid(figures)) .02
>(outline(outline(figures)), circles) .02
>(low(figures, color), circles) .02
Remaining rules .56
41
BP #28
Samples: 240756
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 59244
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left more solid black circles p
>(solid(circles), outline(circles)) .07
>(solid(circles), get(circles, holes)) .03
>(high(circles, color), outline(circles)) .01
>(solid(solid(circles)), outline(circles)) .01
>(solid(circles), outline(outline(circles))) .01
right more outline circles p
>(outline(circles), solid(circles)) .24
>(get(circles, holes), solid(circles)) .10
>(outline(circles), solid(solid(circles))) .02
>(outline(outline(circles)), solid(circles)) .02
>(outline(circles), high(circles, color)) .02
Remaining rules .47
42
BP #29
Samples: 141261
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 158740
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left there are more small circles inside the figure outline than outside p
>(inside(figures), \(small(figures), inside(figures))) .03
>(inside(figures), \(small(circles), inside(figures))) .01
>(inside(figures), \(low(figures, size), inside(figures))) .00
>(inside(figures), \(outline(small(figures)), inside(figures))) .00
>(inside(figures), \(small(figures), inside(large(figures)))) .00
right there are fewer small circles inside the figure outline than outside p
>(\(figures, inside(figures)), inside(figures)) .07
>(\(circles, inside(figures)), inside(figures)) .02
>(∪(triangles, \(figures, inside(figures))), inside(figures)) .00
>(∪(rectangles, \(figures, inside(figures))), inside(figures)) .00
>(\(figures, inside(figures)), inside(large(figures))) .00
Remaining rules .84
43
BP #34
Samples: 298520
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1480
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left a large hole p
>(get(figures, holes), size) .39
∃(large(get(figures, holes))) .10
#(1, large(get(figures, holes))) .04
>(get(get(figures, holes), holes), size) .03
>(get(outline(figures), holes), size) .02
right a small hole p
∃(small(get(figures, holes))) .07
#(1, small(get(figures, holes))) .06
∃(small(small(get(figures, holes)))) .01
∃(low(get(figures, holes), size)) .01
#(1, small(small(get(figures, holes)))) .01
Remaining rules .27
44
BP #35
Samples: 141435
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 158566
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left the axis of the hole is parallel to the figure axis p
(∪(figures, get(figures, holes)), orientation) .29
(∪(get(figures, holes), figures), orientation) .29
(∪(figures, get(get(figures, holes), holes)), orientation) .02
(∪(get(get(figures, holes), holes), figures), orientation) .02
(∪(figures, get(outline(figures), holes)), orientation) .01
right the axis of the hole is perpendicular to the figure axis p
Remaining rules .38
45
BP #36
Samples: 229631
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 70369
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left triangle above circle p
>(circles, triangles, ypos) .29
>(circles, small(figures), ypos) .02
>(circles, outline(triangles), ypos) .02
>(outline(circles), triangles, ypos) .02
>(large(figures), triangles, ypos) .01
right circle above triangle p
>(triangles, circles, ypos) .31
>(triangles, outline(circles), ypos) .02
>(triangles, large(figures), ypos) .02
>(outline(triangles), circles, ypos) .02
>(small(figures), circles, ypos) .02
Remaining rules .28
46
BP #37
Samples: 231512
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 68489
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left triangle above circle p
>(circles, triangles, ypos) .31
>(outline(circles), triangles, ypos) .02
>(circles, outline(triangles), ypos) .02
>(large(figures), triangles, ypos) .02
>(circles, get(triangles, holes), ypos) .01
right circle above triangle p
>(triangles, circles, ypos) .33
>(outline(triangles), circles, ypos) .02
>(triangles, large(figures), ypos) .02
>(triangles, outline(circles), ypos) .02
>(get(triangles, holes), circles, ypos) .01
Remaining rules .24
47
BP #38
Samples: 225658
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 74343
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left triangle larger than circle p
>(triangles, circles, size) .25
>(triangles, outline(circles), size) .01
>(outline(triangles), circles, size) .01
∃(\(large(figures), circles)) .01
>(get(triangles, holes), circles, size) .01
right triangle smaller than circle p
>(circles, triangles, size) .34
>(circles, outline(triangles), size) .02
>(outline(circles), triangles, size) .02
>(figures, get(triangles, holes), size) .01
>(circles, get(triangles, holes), size) .01
Remaining rules .32
48
BP #39
Samples: 280166
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 19834
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left segments almost parallel to each other p
(figures, orientation) .74
(get(figures, hulls), orientation) .09
(solid(figures), orientation) .04
(large(figures), orientation) .02
(get(get(figures, hulls), hulls), orientation) .01
right large angles between segments p
Remaining rules .10
49
BP #40
Samples: 299433
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 568
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left three points on a straight line p
∃(aligned(figures)) .26
∃(aligned(circles)) .26
#(3, aligned(circles)) .06
#(3, aligned(figures)) .06
∃(aligned(aligned(circles))) .03
right no three points on a straight line p
=(figures, \(figures, aligned(figures))) .00
=(circles, \(circles, aligned(circles))) .00
#(4, large(\(figures, aligned(figures)))) .00
=(figures, \(circles, aligned(circles))) .00
=(figures, \(figures, aligned(circles))) .00
Remaining rules .33
50
BP #41
Samples: 299669
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 331
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left outline circles on a straight line p
∃(aligned(outline(figures))) .11
∃(aligned(outline(circles))) .11
∃(aligned(get(circles, holes))) .05
∃(aligned(get(figures, holes))) .05
#(3, aligned(outline(figures))) .03
right outline circles not on a straight line p
∃(outline(\(circles, aligned(outline(circles))))) .00
∃(outline(\(figures, aligned(outline(figures))))) .00
=(circles,∪(circles, aligned(get(circles, holes)))) .00
>(outline(circles), aligned(outline(circles))) .00
=(figures, \(figures, aligned(outline(figures)))) .00
Remaining rules .63
51
BP #42
Samples: 294199
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 5801
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left points inside the figure outline are on a straight line p
∃(aligned(inside(figures))) .22
#(3, aligned(inside(figures))) .08
∃(aligned(aligned(inside(figures)))) .02
∃(aligned(solid(inside(figures)))) .01
∃(solid(aligned(inside(figures)))) .01
right points inside the figure outline are not on a straight line p
>(inside(figures), aligned(inside(figures))) .01
>(large(figures), aligned(inside(figures))) .00
>(outline(figures), aligned(inside(figures))) .00
>(contains(figures), aligned(inside(figures))) .00
>(contains(circles), aligned(inside(figures))) .00
Remaining rules .64
52
BP #47
Samples: 298539
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1463
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left triangle inside of the circle p
∃(contains(triangles)) .10
∃(inside(circles)) .10
#(1, inside(circles)) .03
#(1, contains(triangles)) .03
∃(outline(contains(triangles))) .01
right circle inside of the triangle p
∃(contains(circles)) .12
∃(inside(triangles)) .12
#(1, inside(triangles)) .03
#(1, contains(circles)) .03
∃(contains(inside(triangles))) .01
Remaining rules .43
53
BP #48
Samples: 267885
Runs: 8
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 132118
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left solid dark figures above the outline figures p
>(get(small(figures), holes), ypos) .10
>(outline(figures), solid(figures), ypos) .10
>(small(get(figures, holes)), ypos) .08
>(get(figures, holes), solid(figures), ypos) .05
>(outline(small(figures)), ypos) .02
right outline figures above the solid dark figures p
>(get(low(triangles, size), hulls), large(∪(figures, large(large(get(triangles, holes)))))).00
>(get(get(triangles, hulls), hulls), large(∪(figures, large(large(get(triangles, holes)))))).00
>(get(get(triangles, hulls), holes), large(∪(figures, large(large(get(triangles, holes)))))).00
>(get(triangles, hulls), large(∪(figures, large(large(get(triangles, holes)))))) .00
>(get(get(triangles, hulls), hulls), large(∪(figures, large(large(get(small(triangles), holes)))))).00
Remaining rules .65
54
BP #49
Samples: 298979
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1022
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left points inside the figure outline are grouped more densely than outside the contour p
right points outside the figure outline are grouped more densely than inside the contour p
(figures, distance) .40
(circles, distance) .29
>(inside(figures), distance) .02
(outline(figures), distance) .02
(small(circles), distance) .02
Remaining rules .25
55
BP #51
Samples: 293581
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 6421
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left two circles close to each other p
∃(low(figures, distance)) .13
∃(low(circles, distance)) .13
∃(low(get(figures, holes), distance)) .03
∃(low(get(circles, holes), distance)) .03
∃(low(get(figures, hulls), distance)) .03
right no two circles close to each other p
#(4, high(circles, distance)) .05
#(4, high(figures, distance)) .05
=(high(figures, distance), figures) .03
=(high(circles, distance), circles) .03
=(circles, high(circles, distance)) .02
Remaining rules .49
56
BP #53
Samples: 116809
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 183192
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left inside figure has fewer angles than outside figure p
>(large(figures), inside(figures), ncorners) .08
>(large(figures), small(figures), ncorners) .08
>(contains(figures), inside(figures), ncorners) .07
>(contains(figures), small(figures), ncorners) .07
>(get(inside(figures), hulls), xpos) .03
right inside figure has more angles than outside figure p
>(small(figures), large(figures), ncorners) .02
>(inside(figures), large(figures), ncorners) .01
>(inside(figures), contains(figures), ncorners) .01
>(small(figures), contains(figures), ncorners) .01
>(small(figures), high(figures, size), ncorners) .00
Remaining rules .62
57
BP #56
Samples: 300001
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 0
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left all figures of the same color p
(figures, color) .93
(large(figures), color) .02
(∪(figures, figures), color) .01
(∩(figures, figures), color) .00
(∪(triangles, figures), color) .00
right figures of different colors p
Remaining rules .05
58
BP #58
Samples: 298164
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1836
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left solid dark quadrangles are identical p
(solid(figures), size) .37
(solid(rectangles), size) .37
(solid(solid(rectangles)), size) .04
(solid(solid(figures)), size) .04
(high(figures, color), size) .01
right solid dark quadrangles are different p
Remaining rules .16
59
BP #65
Samples: 299856
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 145
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left a set of triangles elongated horizontally p
(triangles, ypos) .40
(large(figures), ypos) .02
(outline(triangles), ypos) .02
(get(triangles, hulls), ypos) .01
(get(triangles, holes), ypos) .01
right a set of triangles elongated vertically p
(triangles, xpos) .36
(outline(triangles), xpos) .02
(large(figures), xpos) .02
(get(triangles, hulls), xpos) .01
(get(triangles, holes), xpos) .01
Remaining rules .11
60
BP #66
Samples: 298393
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1609
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left unconnected circles on horizontal line p
(figures, ypos) .24
(circles, ypos) .23
(small(figures), ypos) .01
(aligned(figures), ypos) .01
(outline(circles), ypos) .01
right unconnected circles on vertical line p
(circles, xpos) .23
(circles, figures, xpos) .01
(outline(circles), xpos) .01
(aligned(circles), xpos) .01
(small(figures), xpos) .01
Remaining rules .21
61
BP #71
Samples: 298402
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 1599
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left there are inside figures of the second order p
∃(inside(inside(figures))) .20
∃(contains(contains(figures))) .17
#(1, contains(contains(figures))) .05
#(1, inside(inside(figures))) .04
∃(inside(outline(inside(figures)))) .01
right there are no inside figures of the second order p
#(1, low(contains(figures), xpos)) .00
#(1, low(contains(small(figures)), xpos)) .00
#(1, low(contains(low(figures, size)), xpos)) .00
#(1, low(contains(outline(figures)), xpos)) .00
#(1, low(contains(inside(contains(figures))), xpos)) .00
Remaining rules .53
62
BP #79
Samples: 74860
Runs: 6
Burn-in: 100000
Discarded rules with mistakes: 225140
p = proportion of samples for this rule
left a dark circle is closer to the outline circle than to the triangle p
right a dark circle is closer to the triangle than to the outline circle p
>(circles,∪(solid(circles), triangles), distance) .12
>(circles,∪(triangles, solid(circles)), distance) .09
>(circles, \(figures, outline(circles)), distance) .06
>(circles,∪(solid(figures), triangles), distance) .06
>(circles,∪(triangles, solid(figures)), distance) .05
Remaining rules .61
63
